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 The history of definitions of metaphor is a history of hopeful efforts, none of 
which fully succeed in providing a satisfying answer to the question of what it is.  
Aristotle’s original attempts to grapple with metaphor continue to inform (or infect) 
contemporary definitions of the term. “Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name 
that belongs to something else” [Aristotle Poetics 1457b5] on the basis of some kind of 
similarity. Everyone uses metaphor to communicate, but when aptly made, a 
metaphor is “strange” yet “sweet,” and thus “most brings about the learning” … but 
shaping good metaphors requires a special kind of genius that “cannot be learned 
from anyone else,” Aristotle says [Aristotle Rhetoric 1410b]. Metaphor is a strange 
mix of the familiar and the unfamiliar, it is common and a mark of genius. For 
Aristotle a metaphor may connect two familiar things in unfamiliar ways such that 
the strangeness of it may be instructive.  More commonly, metaphor is defined as 
that which associates an unfamiliar term with a familiar one in order to illuminate 
the former in light of its similarity with the latter. Aristotle’s first definition seems 
banally simple: metaphor makes one thing stand for another.  
 The vagueness and generality of these definitions suggests an ineradicable 
circularity from the start: definitions of metaphor inevitably rely on metaphors. For 
example, the very notion of “standing” for something is itself a metaphor, one that 
has great significance in jurisprudence. The notions of familiarity, similarity, and 
their cognates, which lie at the heart of so many definitions of metaphor, are 
themselves metaphorical concepts. Metaphor is an oddly self-referential bit of 
language whose description can only ever be a performance of its meaning. 
 The following seven sections begin with a discussion of metaphor in science 
generally, then proceed to an examination of its role in chemical thinking in three 
contexts: the history and philosophy of chemistry, laboratory research practice, and 
chemical education. The chapter concludes with a section on the specifically 
chemical understanding of metaphor. 
 
1. Metaphor in Science 
 The positive role of metaphor in science has been noted by philosophers, 
historians of chemistry1, science education researchers and educators2 where it has 
often been hailed as a descriptive and explanatory device that stimulates and shapes 
concept development. Several philosophers3 have noted the ubiquity of metaphor 
and proposed that all language is metaphorical. In his masterful treatment of that act 
of metaphoring, philosopher Kuang-Ming Wu, presents an extensive cross-cultural 
hermeneutical survey of the variety of attempts to define metaphor.  He finds all of 
them incomplete, though each one may be more or less helpful regarding some 
aspect.  Not so helpful are attempts to treat metaphor as one among several figures of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  T.	  Nummedal	  [2011]	  ,	  Bensaude-­‐Vincent	  and	  Stengers	  [1996],	  Newman	  and	  Principe	  [1998],	  Dobbs	  [2002],	  Merchant	  [1980],	  and	  others.	  2	  Jeppson,	  F	  [2013],	  Aubusson	  [2006],	  Tobin	  and	  Tippins[1996],	  Hofmann	  [1990]	  and	  others.	  3	  Black	  [1967],	  Cassirer	  [1953],	  Hesse	  [1966,	  1988],	  	  Harre	  [1982],	  among	  others.	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speech, and subsequent attempts to split hairs among them. I follow Wu in his 
treatment of simile, metonymy and other non-literal forms, as different kinds of 
metaphoric activity, for in order to achieve the effects for which they are so often 
called upon, all non-literal forms of language rely on metaphoring. It is most beneficial, 
therefore, to see metaphor as a general form of communication activity, rather than 
as a specific linguistic formula that follows specific rules.4 Any attempt at hardening 
a definition of metaphor inevitably cracks up as novel forms of expression and 
understanding naturally emerge from cultural advancement.  
 Before moving on to discuss the specific case of metaphor in science, we may 
bring these general considerations of metaphor and language full circle in the context 
of Alfred North Whitehead’s “fallacy of the perfect dictionary.” Like other fallacies 
Whitehead introduces in the course of his philosophical reflections on science, this 
one points to the seemingly natural tendency of thought to capture the dynamism of 
concrete reality in static abstractions. One who commits the fallacy of the perfect 
dictionary misconceives both language and thought:  There	  is	  an	  insistent	  presupposition	  continually	  sterilizing	  philosophic	  thought.	  It	  is	  the	  belief,	  the	  very	  natural	  belief,	  that	  mankind	  has	  consciously	  entertained	  all	  the	  fundamental	  ideas	  which	  are	  applicable	  to	  its	  experience.	  Further	  it	  is	  held	  that	  human	  language,	  in	  single	  words	  or	  in	  phrases,	  explicitly	  expresses	  these	  ideas.	  I	  will	  term	  this	  presupposition,	  “The	  Fallacy	  of	  the	  Perfect	  Dictionary.”	  [Whitehead	  1938,	  173] 
Whitehead uses the fallacy to distinguish two philosophical attitudes: the “critical 
school” and the “speculative school:”  	  	  	  The	  critical	  school	  confines	  itself	  to	  verbal	  analysis	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  dictionary.	  The	  speculative	  school	  appeals	  to	  direct	  insight,	  and	  endeavors	  to	  indicate	  its	  meanings	  by	  further	  appeal	  to	  situations	  which	  promote	  such	  specific	  insights.	  It	  then	  enlarges	  the	  dictionary.	  [Whitehead	  1938,	  173] 
Cultures advance, languages continually change, as does thought. In the midst of all 
of this change, the speculative school of philosophy finds in metaphor an engine of 
change, the source of linguistic and conceptual growth. In addition to those 
mentioned earlier, Bailer-Jones [2000, 2002], Ricouer [1981] and Miller [1986, 1996] 
are among philosophers who subscribe to the creative potential of metaphor in the 
science. 
 Metaphor, as Aristotle indicated, helps to make the unfamiliar familiar, but 
the current of meaning can flow both ways: the familiar can also be rendered 
unfamiliar enough to appear novel, strange and interesting. The dialectic of novelty 
and confirmation, so important to the Shannon definition of information, is also at 
play in the way that metaphor functions. How much a metaphor would lean towards 
confirmation or novelty, its signal-to-noise ratio in a given context, depends on a 
variety of complex factors. In this paper, we limit the contexts to those of education 
and research. Considered abstractly, education and research are polar opposites: 
research seeks novelty in the form of invention and discovery, while education strives 
to confirm the next generation of researchers by assuring their mastery of basic 
vocabularies, concepts and skills. But we must avoid mistaking these abstractions for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  This	  is,	  in	  fact,	  what	  Cassirer	  [1953]	  called	  “radical	  metaphor”	  and	  Kuhn	  [1977;	  1979]	  referred	  to	  as	  “metaphor-­‐like	  processes.”	  This	  theme	  is	  discussed	  in	  depth	  in	  sections	  5	  and	  6	  below.	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concrete actualities.5 While education generally leans more toward confirmation-
oriented uses of metaphor, opportunities for student research may sometimes lead to 
breakthroughs. And whereas research is often geared toward the creation of novel 
metaphors in the process of model building, there are perhaps too many cases of 
research that merely confirms and solidifies the hold of a given approach. The 
creative potential of science is enhanced whenever metacognition is engaged in 
education or research, that is, when the function of metaphor in scientific thinking is 
acknowledged and, to whatever extent, understood and applied.6 
Like Niels Bohr’s horseshoe7, metaphor works whether or not one recognizes 
it as metaphor. And once it gains sufficient currency it is no longer considered 
metaphorical: it has made the transition from non-literal to literal. Commitment to a 
metaphor’s literal “truth” has to last only as long as its ability to move inquiry 
forward; literal truth has no permanent status as literal and its lifespan is not known 
in advance of its employment. The creative power of metaphor is its liminality; this is 
also the source of its disruptive power. Paul Ricouer has noted that metaphor, like 
poetry, plays on the boundary between dogmatic commitment and speculative 
distance: 
What is given to thought in this way by the ‘tensional’ truth of 
poetry is the primordial, most hidden dialectic--the dialectic 
that reigns between the experience of belonging as a whole and 
the power of distantiation that opens up the space of speculative 
thought. [1981, 371] 
Metaphor enables the participation mystique of true dogma while maintaining a 
potential distance from the matter at hand (e.g., from the theoretical framework or 
model used in a given research project), thus providing a cognitive wedge that opens 
a space for speculation. 
Self-reflexive awareness of metaphor renders its semantic frame labile—an 
important feature during times of conceptual fluctuation and growth… which come 
at an increasingly rapid pace for new areas of research. For Rom Harré the necessity 
of resorting to metaphor can be stated very simply:   
We need metaphor because in some cases it is the only way to say 
what we mean since the existing semantic fields of current 
terminology referentially related to the subject in question are 
inadequate to our own thought. [Harré 1982, 95]  
He considers metaphor to be an interventional tool rather than representational one.8 
Metaphor’s capacity to make a difference for a given inquiry is what matters, not its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  National	  Science	  Foundation	  and	  other	  science	  agencies	  have	  sought	  to	  dispel	  institutional	  tendencies	  to	  polarize	  the	  two	  modes	  of	  practice	  by	  issuing	  funding	  solicitations	  that	  call	  for	  integrative	  undergraduate	  science	  curricula.	  For	  example	  the	  NSF’s	  Undergraduate	  Research	  Centers.	  	  6	  See	  Graves’	  [2005]	  treatment	  of	  this	  theme	  in	  section	  4,	  and	  Bhushan	  and	  Rosenfeld’s	  [1995]	  treatment	  in	  section	  5,	  below.	  7	  As	  the	  story	  goes,	  a	  visiting	  physicist	  commented	  on	  a	  horseshoe	  hanging	  above	  the	  doorway	  of	  Bohr’s	  country	  home,	  “Bohr,	  I	  didn’t	  know	  you	  believed	  in	  such	  superstitions!”	  to	  which	  Bohr	  responded:	  “I	  don't,	  but	  I’ve	  heard	  that	  it	  works	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  believes	  in	  it.”	  8	  Following Ian Hacking’s [1983] Representing and Intervening.	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ability to accurately represent phenomena in various circumstances. The pragmatic 
aspect of metaphor puts its semantic lability to work to facilitate inquiry. Therefore, 
epistemological commitment to metaphor is justifiably flexible. A metaphor that is 
successfully put to use for a specific purpose may lose its usefulness, only to find it 
again if a new problem activates its multivalent potentials.  
 
2.The Metaphor at the Foundations of Chemistry: Defining Element 
  A self-reflexive commitment to metaphor remains aware of its opportunities 
and limits, even when these have yet to be discovered with precision. This way of 
holding metaphor in mind makes particular sense in the context of chemistry. A 
significant case is found in the official International Union of Pure and Applied 
Chemistry (IUPAC) definition of chemical element, which, in an unusual turn, 
embodies a key duality9. On the one hand element is defined as atom, on the other 
hand as substance: 
1. A species of atoms; all atoms with the same number of protons in the atomic 
nucleus.  
2. A pure chemical substance composed of atoms with the same number of 
protons in the atomic nucleus. Sometimes this concept is called the 
elementary substance as distinct from the chemical element as defined under 
1, but mostly the term chemical element is used for both concepts.  
     [http://goldbook.iupac.org/C01022.html] 
 The relation between the two sub-definitions is similar to that which 
metaphor posits between any pair of subjects. No matter how subtle or great the 
difference between them, pairings of this kind open a space, as Ricouer noted, for 
speculation. A careful pairing of similarities and differences is, after all, the business 
of metaphor. An analogy can be drawn between metaphoric pairings and the pairing 
of wine and food: the pairing brings out latent flavors in both food and wine. In 
gustatory pairings flavors are amplified or diminished by combination. A metaphoric 
pairing is more complex in that it operates in the polysemic medium of language.
 Ordinary language is by nature polysemic: individual words, not to mention 
phrases and statements, may admit of more than one meaning. Polysemic potential 
is further broadened by taking pragmatic and contextual considerations into account. 
Polysemy is an aspect of every language but scientific language strives to eliminate 
conceptual ambiguity by reducing the polysemic potential of key terms. One example 
of this is to be found in chemical nomenclature; the formal definition of terms by 
professional societies, such as IUPAC, is another.  
 In light of this fact, finding explicit bivalence in the official definition of 
‘chemical element,’ at the very heart of chemistry, seems odd. The historical and 
disciplinary reasons behind it have been the topic of several articles in the philosophy 
of chemistry arena10. The definition originated with Fritz Paneth in 1931, in 
association with his successful work on the status of isotopes, which had been a 
vexing problem of early 20th century chemistry. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  A full discussion of the development of this definition and its impact on chemical research and 
education appears section 6 of this chapter. 10	  See,	  among	  others,	  Earley	  [2009],	  Harre	  [2009],	  Mahootian	  [2013],	  Ruthenberg	  [2009],	  and	  Scerri	  [2000,	  2005,	  2009],	  and	  of	  course	  Paneth	  [1931/1962],	  who	  originated	  this	  definition.	  
Farzad	  Mahootian	   fm57@nyu.edu	   preprint	   	  
5	  of	  19	  
 Paneth explicitly accounted for his bivalent definition and employed the 
metaphor of “oscillation” (Schwanken) by explicitly noting its function in chemical 
thinking. He introduced the metaphor in the historical context of the Boyle-Spinoza 
debate over nitre:  
Boyle’s statement that nitre ‘consists’ of volatile nitric acid and a solid 
residue shows just that oscillation [Schwanken] between the naive-
realistic and the transcendental meanings of the terms which we exhibited 
above as particularly characteristic of the concept of element. [Paneth 
2003, 136, emphasis original] 
This historical illustration comes at the end of Paneth’s two-part article (originally 
published in 193111) whose purpose was to illustrate the epistemology of specifically 
chemical thinking. Though he does not label it as a metaphor, he takes advantage of 
the metaphoric potential of this dual-mode definition of chemical element. The self-
reflexive use of metaphor in chemistry potentiates one’s awareness of various 
frameworks of explanation, including disciplinary, conceptual, instrumental, etc. 
Paneth explicitly noted two frameworks— naïve realism and transcendental 
idealism—as the ones operative in the case of chemical element. I generalize 
Paneth’s point in my (admittedly metaphoric) re-description of metaphor as that 
which enables and directs deliberate transitions between explanatory frames as needs 
arise in practical contexts of research, teaching, or engineering— naïve realism and 
transcendental idealism are only two possibilities among many [Mahootian 2013].  I 
claim that while such transitions are apparent in the history of any empirically 
grounded discipline, chemistry contains some of the clearest illustrations.  
 
3. Metaphor in the History of Chemistry 
 With the growing general interest in metaphor there has been corresponding 
increase in the literature on metaphor in the philosophy of science. An excellent 
survey of the topic, by Daniela Bailer-Jones, appears in the Blackwell Guide to the 
Philosophy of Science.  The closing line of her chapter provides a segue for discussing 
the history of chemistry, as it highlights the inextricable links between model, 
metaphor, practice and ordinary language. She notes that 
beyond the commonalties of scientific models and metaphor already highlighted, 
there is one other: scientific models appear to be, contrary to past research traditions, 
as central in scientific practice for describing and communicating aspects of the 
empirical world as metaphors are in ordinary language. [Bailer-Jones 2002, 127] 
Bailer-Jones speculates analogically about this pair of pairs:  
 
model : scientific practice : : metaphor : ordinary language 
 
The analogy is not simple, as there are multiple interrelations between the four terms. 
Her main intent seems to be to illuminate the role of models in scientific practice as 
being similar to that of metaphor in ordinary language. However, because of the 
ambiguous role of ordinary language in scientific practice, and especially because of 
the function of metaphor in modeling (and of models in metaphoring), the analogy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  It was translated into English for publication in 1962 as “The epistemological status of the chemical 
concept of element” in British Journal of the Philosophy of Science. 13, 1–14 and144–160; it was reprinted 
in Foundations of Chemistry 5, 2003, 113–145. 
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can readily be made to work in several directions at once, making the nexus of 
relations among the four more metaphorical than a straightforward (e.g. scientific) 
analogy should allow. Aristotle proposed that within metaphor the familiar term 
illuminates the unfamiliar, but one may as well assert that familiar and unfamiliar 
illuminate one another, occasionally trading places with sometimes surprising 
results12. Such surprises often occur when familiar terms, models, instruments, etc., 
are applied to objects and domains beyond those in which and for which they were 
originally designed and intended.   
 Mary Jo Nye’s conceptual history of chemistry, From Chemical Philosophy to 
Theoretical Chemistry, self-consciously traces the development of a specifically 
chemical approach to science, as distinct from physics. Nye briefly notes the 
relevance of metaphor throughout the history of chemistry and discusses specific 
examples in the 18th and 19th centuries13. She distinguishes “conventionalized 
metaphor,” what 19th century chemist Wurz referred to as “a way of expressing a fact 
rather than giving an explanation,” from whimsical and playful descriptions, such as 
A. Laurent’s 1854 descriptions of atoms on the “chase,” in “copulation,” and in 
“marriages of convenience.” [Nye 1993, 78-80]. But all metaphor is a play on 
language and an alteration of everyday usage.  While the extremes seem obviously 
distinct, the line that divides them is not easily discerned— certainly not during the 
period when such metaphors are suggested, for “as the problems change, so, often, 
does the standard that distinguishes a real scientific solution from a mere 
metaphysical speculation, word game, or mathematical play.” [Kuhn 1962, 103] 
 The history of the concept of chemical affinity presents an interesting case in 
point. Nye demonstrates how this concept, originally considered explanatory, was 
later rejected in the light of other concepts and relevant new experimental data. The 
affinity concept reaches from its ancient origins in alchemy (like attracts like14), to its 
application in E. F. Geoffroy’s 1718 table of chemical “rapports” for replacement 
reactions. The concept enjoyed new acceptance with H. Boerhaave’s [1733] 
subsequent reinterpretation of affinity in terms of Newtonian forces of attraction and 
repulsion. Chemical affinity’s gradual decline from mid- to late-19th century, 
culminated in its rejection by J. L. Meyer as merely fictional. Nevertheless, the 
concept played an important role in the development of thermodynamic models of 
chemical reaction, and in the classifications of chemical elements. Nye’s foreclosure 
on the 19th century history of affinity is somewhat premature, Meyer’s objections 
notwithstanding. The concept enjoyed active use into the 20th century: Van‘t Hoff 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Analytic	  philosopher,	  Max Black [1962] applied rhetoric theoretician I.A. Richards’ interaction 
theory of metaphor in this manner. Kuang-Ming Wu’s [2001] cross-cultural hermeneutic approach to 
metaphor affirms this point with examples from several contexts and languages.	  13	  Nye	  completely	  excludes	  alchemy	  from	  her	  account—this	  is	  an	  important	  omission	  that	  follows	  in	  the	  steps	  of	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  century	  historiography	  of	  science.	  	  I.	  Stengers	  and	  B.	  Bensaude-­‐Vincent’s	  History	  of	  Chemistry,	  published	  only	  a	  few	  years	  after	  Nye	  [1993],	  showed	  how	  fundamental	  concepts	  of	  chemistry,	  such	  as	  analysis,	  isolation	  and	  purification	  were	  developed	  to	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  sophistication.	  From	  the	  late	  1990s	  to	  the	  early	  2000s,	  W.	  Newman	  and	  L.	  Principe	  provided	  a	  wealth	  of	  documentary	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  inclusion	  of	  alchemy	  in	  the	  history	  of	  chemistry.	  Tara	  Nummedal	  discusses	  the	  versatility	  of	  alchemy’s	  promotion	  of	  chemistry.	  14	  The	  term	  “like	  attracts	  like”	  still	  enjoys	  broad	  usage	  ranging	  from	  matchmaking	  websites	  to	  titles	  and	  abstracts	  of	  research	  articles	  in	  academic	  journals	  of	  physics,	  chemistry	  and	  molecular	  biology.	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refers positively to affinity as a central link in his 1907 Nobel prize winning 
integration of gas laws and osmotic pressure.  Stepping back from details such as this, 
Nye’s narrative of the positive role metaphor plays in chemistry is generally on 
target: 
The role of metaphor in defining a scientific object and suggesting a 
method of investigation is demonstrated in the history of the chemical 
discipline, both in the development of conventional definitions of the 
causes of chemical effects and in the working out of a system, which, by 
describing substances in the language of natural history, encouraged 
chemists to think about these objects along genealogical and 
morphological lines. [Nye 1993, 78; italics original] 
 
 The gain of epistemic access through metaphor is gradual. It occurs as a 
dialectical process that begins with epistemic commitment to a conceptual metaphor, 
which inevitably means commitment to some level of conceptual error. In the course 
of applying the metaphor in model-building [e.g. Harré 1982], we observe an 
alternating series of reifications and retreats from reification. In the centuries-long 
transition from chemical affinities to thermodynamics, we can trace the career of the 
mythical idea of nature as organism, to the metaphorical idea of “like attracts like” 
(which shaped sympathetic magic and alchemical thinking in pre-modern Europe), 
to 18th century affinity tables, and finally to the gradual refinement of the idea of 
energy and energetic relationships among chemical compounds in various reaction 
environments.  Such adjustments are made in the context of chemical practice: the 
more or less coordinated but always interdependent and mutual refinement of 
concepts, instruments, experimental design and observational targets. In this respect, 
contemporary studies of science in practice bear similarities with science education 
studies, as indicated below. 
 
4. Metaphor in a Solid State Physics Lab 
 In this section, we focus on the uses of metaphor in a contemporary research 
lab. Heather Graves spent seven months studying the rhetoric of inquiry in a solid 
state physics lab with a seasoned researcher and his graduate students. She focused 
much of her time on research about amorphous semiconductors, specifically, 
persistent photoconductivity. What Graves learned about the function of metaphor 
in this context can be readily transferred to our study of chemistry.  
 Rhetoric In(to) Science: Style as Invention in Inquiry [Graves 2005], argues that 
since the time of Robert Boyle, and culminating in the work of Joseph Priestly, 
science has appropriated the rhetoric of invention theory into scientific method. One 
of the founders of experimental method, Boyle considered it important to 
communicate what and how he thought about his experiments, taking pains to 
recreate his thinking in the mind of his reader (recall Whitehead’s characterization of 
speculative philosophers, in section 1, above). He made this an explicit goal of his 
style of writing. Both he and Priestly held metaphor and analogy to be far more than 
merely decorative or persuasive: both saw metaphor as a means of “meditating” and 
“reflecting” upon ideas. Both considered metaphor as a chief means of associating 
and extending ideas by “transferring similarities” from one domain to another. This 
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transference is explicitly discussed by Priestly in both his scientific and religious 
writings.	  [Graves	  2005,	  75]  	   Graves	  reports	  that	  her	  interactions	  with	  lab	  director	  Edward	  MacDonald	  [a	  pseudonym]	  stimulated	  him	  to	  do	  his	  science	  “aloud.”	  This	  provided	  her	  with	  several	  opportunities	  to	  record	  the	  development	  of	  analogies	  and	  metaphors.	  She	  noted	  varying	  degrees	  of	  success	  in	  the	  application	  of	  metaphors	  and	  analogies	  to	  the	  task	  of	  interpreting	  experimental	  data.	  Normally,	  MacDonald	  would	  sit	  at	  the	  computer,	  revising	  and	  deleting,	  until	  he	  had	  the	  most	  unambiguous	  text	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  communicating	  research	  findings.	  Graves’	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  several	  episodes	  of	  experimental	  work	  by	  MacDonald	  and	  his	  research	  team,	  demonstrates	  the	  epistemic	  contribution	  of	  rhetoric	  in	  a	  number	  of	  instances.	  Most	  of	  her	  observations	  pertain	  to	  the	  re-­‐interpretation	  of	  experimental	  findings	  in	  the	  course	  of	  preparing	  an	  article	  draft	  for	  publication.	  She	  shows	  how	  such	  discussions	  were	  often	  coupled	  with	  refinements	  to	  the	  lab’s	  research	  strategy.	  	  	   To	  conclude	  this	  section	  I	  note	  that	  Graves’	  discussion	  of	  the	  use	  of	  analogy,	  metaphor	  and	  metonymy15	  in	  the	  research	  process	  is	  consistent	  with	  previous	  work	  in	  this	  area;	  while	  there	  are	  several	  instances	  to	  draw	  upon,	  only	  two	  will	  be	  noted.	   
 The first	  instance	  confirms	  Mary	  Hesse’s	  [1980]	  understanding	  of	  the	  function	  of	  analogy	  in	  science	  research:	  MacDonald	  first	  predicts	  and	  later	  confirms	  a	  particular	  phenomenon.	  The	  analogy	  he	  draws	  between	  hoodoos	  and	  an	  amorphous	  silicon	  nitride	  superlattice	  cross-­‐section,	  “establishes	  three	  known	  terms	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  predicting	  a	  fourth	  unknown	  term.”	  [Graves	  2005,	  102].	  	  	  
 In contrast with those who focus on the discursive qualities of science but not 
its practice, and those who focus on its practice but not on its rhetoric, Graves 
focuses on the role of rhetoric in the process of inquiry.[Graves 2002, 2] In so doing, 
she clarifies one aspect of the role of metaphor in concept formation in and through the 
process of grappling with data and models. The key link in this process is the act of 
invention wherein novelty is introduced to the practice of science by “mangling” data, 
theory and interpretation, as Andrew Pickering calls it.  The “mangle of practice,”16 
characterizes the concrete practice of lab bench science. As a quantum physicist, 
Pickering’s [1984] research experience with quarks led him to reflect on the practice 
of science and the articulation of the mangle of practice described above. He 
summarizes the process: 
modeling has an important real-time structure, with contours of 
cultural extension being determined by the emergence of resistances, 
and by the success or failure of ‘accommodations’ to resistance… This 
temporal structuring of practice as a dialectic of resistance and 
accommodation is, in the first instance, what I have come to call the 
mangle of practice. [Pickering 1995, xi] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Graves focuses more of her analysis on the lab’s use of metonyms than on metaphors, however, the 
case has been made in section 1 above, that the various genera of non-literal usages of language 
actually function metaphorically, even if they are not identical in form to metaphors. Kuhn’s [1977, 
1979] and Cassirer’s [1953] discussions of this idea are found in sections 5 and 6, below.	  16	  Pickering’s	  seemingly	  odd	  choice	  of	  this	  term	  harks	  back	  to	  old-­‐time	  clothes	  washing	  machines	  which	  had	  no	  spin	  cycle.	  Instead,	  wet	  clothing	  were	  put	  through	  the	  ringer	  and	  the	  resulting	  “mangle”	  consisted	  of	  diverse	  items	  of	  damp	  clothing	  pressed	  into	  a	  single,	  flat,	  apparently	  continuous	  plank.	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At various points in the research cycle, as researchers inevitably encounter results 
that are somewhat different than expected, they will alter the ceteris paribus conditions, 
the explanatory model, the selection of relevant theories, the boundary conditions of 
the phenomena under scrutiny, even the standard operating procedures of their 
laboratory equipment. Essentially anything, whether theoretical or instrumental, that 
can be bent to its near-breaking point will be bent; theory and model will be made to 
accommodate instruments and experiment design and vice versa, until expectations 
of acceptable experimental outcomes closely match actual experimental outcomes.  
 Graves’ analysis of the rhetoric of invention in MacDonald’s descriptions of 
his research team’s model-building efforts is consistent with Pickering’s 
understanding of the mangle of practice. MacDonald and his co-workers undertook 
to modify standard solid state physics models in order to fit the diverse experimental 
settings for which they were not originally designed; in some cases, modifications 
were stimulated by peer-review comments accompanying the rejection of their article 
for publication in a journal. 
  
5. Metaphor in Chemistry Education 
 Nalini Bhushan and Stuart Rosenfeld’s 1995 article, “Metaphorical Models in 
Chemistry,” offers an analysis of metaphor in reference to scientific modeling in the 
service of specific pedagogy in chemical education. The authors cite James 
Hofmann’s [1990] study of “How the Models of Chemistry Vie,” a play on Nancy 
Cartwright’s [1983] How the Laws of Physics Lie. Hoffmann distinguishes two 
functions of models in chemistry as “the culmination of phenomenology and the 
commencement of explanation” [Hofmann 1990, 406]. The former offers “specific 
causal scenarios,” while the latter presents “unifying explanatory formalisms.” 
Oddly, Bhushan and Rosenfeld substitute these functions with the not exactly 
equivalent pairing of “predictive” vs. “insightful.” The contrast of causal scenarios 
from predictive ones, and explanatory formalisms from insightful ones requires 
clarification. In the context of their discussion, Bhushan and Rosenfeld note that “[a] 
working view for students might be that models should be seen as tools for prediction 
and correlation but that one should remain aware of their metaphorical standing.” 
[Bhushan, Rosenfeld 1995, 579]  
 An understanding of the “standing” of models as “metaphorical” is sufficient 
to arm the student against swallowing the model whole, as it were, and taking it as 
literal truth. Bhushan and Rosenfeld consider this to be good pedagogy.  
Furthermore, they note that both aspects, prediction and insight, are metaphorical, 
since it is “not so odd to view computational models as metaphorical” [581]. Though 
they don’t say so explicitly, their pedagogy elucidates the metaphorical nature of 
models in order to disabuse students from habitually thinking of models as 
representations. Bhushan and Rosenfeld’s pedagogical ideals seem consistent with 
thinking about models as interventions rather than literal descriptions. Although the 
authors conclude their article with the following passage, it is unclear whether, in the 
final sentence, they are using the term model in a metaphorical way: 
Our own lack of attention to the metaphorical nature of a particular model 
can blind us as teachers to certain misunderstandings of students. As we use 
models in teaching, it may be important to recognize that the leading edge, 
and perhaps the most important part of the model for students, is the metaphor.  
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Indeed, we might say that where we use models in our teaching, the 
metaphor is the currency of the teacher-student transaction. [582] 
Indeed, they introduce a metaphor, i.e., the currency of a transaction, to characterize 
their own use of metaphor. This would seem to reinforce Bailer-Jones’ closing 
statement which exhorts us to consider whether model may be as ubiquitous in 
science as metaphor is acknowledged to be in language. Furthermore, Bhushan and 
Rosenfeld’s currency metaphor makes explicit a value orientation that Mary Hesse 
asserted as a necessary part of metaphor. In Hesse’s words,[MISSING WORD] is an 
“evaluative interpretation,” i.e., one that takes a “proper stance” toward the 
phenomenon in question and thus “implies that metaphor is concerned with action 
as well as description.” [Hesse 1988, 14] This is also consistent with Thomas Kuhn’s 
remarks on metaphor and science education. 
 In his later writings, Kuhn highlights the work of metaphor in the education 
of naïve science students as a case of changing “seeing” into “seeing as,” for example, 
seeing certain spots in a microscope as microorganisms. Making invisibles visible also 
makes other visibles invisible in order to clear the way, so to speak, toward the newly 
identified target.  Kuhn takes metaphor to be "essentially a higher-level of the process 
by which ostention enters into the establishment of reference for natural kind terms.” 
[Kuhn 1979, 537]  His "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," deal with the related 
question, "How do scientists attach symbolic expressions to nature?" Kuhn couches 
his answer in terms of the activity of "recognizing similarity sets," or transforming 
seeing into seeing-as.  To successfully solve the problems in a science textbook 
requires just this ability.  "The student discovers a way to see his problem as like a 
problem he has already encountered.  Once that likeness has been seen, only 
manipulative difficulties remain." [Kuhn 1977, 470] Science education, according to 
Kuhn, involves conveying to the student a body of standard examples ("exemplars" or 
paradigms).  "Acquiring an arsenal of exemplars, just as much as learning symbolic 
generalizations, is integral to the process by which a student gains access to the 
cognitive achievements of his disciplinary group.” [Kuhn 1977, 471]  These 
exemplars are often in the form of specific problems and their solutions which have 
been raised from the myriad situations encountered in naive experience. There are 
several standard metaphors in these statements that might attract the usual kinds of 
attention (inquiry as a war that requires an “arsenal”) but I would direct our 
attention to a deeper layer: attachment, as in the “attachment of symbolic 
expressions to nature.” [Kuhn 1977, 467] The process of reference-fixing, or 
"dubbing," is what Kuhn calls a "metaphor-like process," which he considers more 
fundamental and less obvious than the similar process operative in metaphor. 
“Metaphor plays an essential role establishing links between scientific language and the 
world.” [Kuhn 1979, 539, emphasis added]  
The establishment of "similarity sets" is a specialty of the metaphoric mode of 
discourse. Kuhn notes that “[it] is sometimes (perhaps always) revealing to view 
metaphor as creating or calling forth the similarities upon which its function depends.  
With that position I very much agree.”[Kuhn 1979, 533] The process of scientific 
education, as well as that of scientific discovery and invention, involves just this kind 
of mental transmutation:  a creation of categories by means of elevating certain 
impressions from the realm of naïve realism into the realm of scientific significance.  
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Kuhn approaches this conception, finally dropping the distinction between metaphor 
and metaphor-like processes, for the sake of brevity:  
‘metaphor’ refers to all those processes in which the juxtaposition 
either of terms or of concrete examples calls forth a network of 
similarities which help to determine the way in which language attaches 
to the world. [Kuhn 1979, 539 emphasis added] 
 Whether or not Kuhn is aware of this (and there is no indication of this in his 
writing), the idea of any attachment of language to the world is metaphorical. Ernst 
Cassirer, on the other hand makes this an explicit claim that lies at the basis of his 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.  For Cassirer, the very act of speech, the act of attaching 
thought to a medium that is fundamentally different from thought (i.e., sound) is 
itself an embodiment of metaphor, as one thing is made to stand for another. 
Cassirer also notes that “radical” metaphors don't merely point out similarities and 
dissimilarities, they institute them. This is one manner in which metaphorical 
commitment has practical, even material impact. 
 The question of how conceptual categories are first instituted is one that is 
relevant to both research and education. A recent study of the use of metaphor in 
science by education researcher, Frederik Jeppsson and his co authors17 makes three 
key claims about the role of conceptual metaphor (CM) in scientific problem solving. 
In the course of making these claims, the authors review much of the literature of 
education theory on this topic and affirm a key point that is of interest to my 
analysis: the question of whether experts and novices share conceptual strategies, or 
employ distinct ones in solving scientific problems. Until recently the latter position18 
was favored, but recent evidence arising from education research has provided 
support to the former position, represented in the work of Gupta, et al. For example, 
according to Gupta, novice and expert use similar conceptual resources, but in 
addition to having a broader variety of CMs, experts have greater flexibility with 
regard to the ones they use.  In their studies, Gupta, et al, show that both expert and 
novice use basic CMs drawn from everyday experience, often reifying concepts or 
processes, for example, treating them as material substances in the course of 
reasoning about them. Whatever may be the degree to which experts use concrete 
metaphors instead of the “abstract” and “constraint-based”19 ones specific to a given 
disciplinary discourse, they switch seamlessly between CMs. The switch may occur 
between different phases of the research process, and/or between doing research and 
teaching. This finding confirms the liminality of metaphor discussed in sec. 1, above. 
 Gupta found that besides reifying concepts as material substance, researchers 
also engaged in metaphorical identification with and projection of agency. These 
tendencies were exemplified in Graves’ observation of MacDonald’s researchers. 
These tendencies are consistent with the definition of metaphor as a rhetorical form 
that introduces something unfamiliar in terms of something familiar. There are other 
compelling reasons for favoring Jeppsson’s presentation of the continuity between 
expert and novice. The history of science is full of stories about how the expert’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Fredrik	  Jeppsson,	  Jesper	  Haglund	  ,	  Tamer	  G.	  Amin	  &	  Helge	  Strmdahl	  [2013]	  Exploring	  the	  Use	  of	  Conceptual	  Metaphors	  in	  Solving	  Problems	  on	  Entropy,	  Journal	  of	  the	  Learning	  Sciences,	  22:1,	  70-­‐120.	  18	  represented	  by	  Chi	  and	  Slotta	  [Jeppsson	  2013,	  72]	  19	  	  Jeppsson,	  et	  al	  [2013,	  72]	  quoting	  Chi & Slotta, 1993.	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mentality mingles with that of the novice in the initial framing of an incorrect model. 
Thompson’s plum pudding model and Rutherford’s solar system model of the atom 
were later refined by others in the course of trying to apply them in theory building 
and experimental design. 
 Ernst Cassirer’s neo-Kantian epistemology grounds his Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms20 on the continuity between different modes of symbolic thinking, with mythic 
and scientific thinking occupying the extremes. Rather than summarize its argument 
here, I note that some of his key conclusions are supportive of the continuity thesis 
developed by Gupta et al, and incorporated in the claims of Jeppsson, et al. The 
following excerpt from Cassirer’s chapter on “The Power of Metaphor” suffices to 
show the consistency of his analysis with what Jeppsson et al. note as the crucial 
feature of expert knowledge: flexibility with respect to choices among conceptual 
metaphors, and a metacognitive grasp of such decision-making and implementation.  
Cassirer talks about the final stages in the development of thought, wherein self-
consciousness is characterized by self-possession. At its final stages of development, 
thought is no longer compelled by concrete aspects of imagination that shape the two 
instruments that co-evolved, and thus co-determine one another, namely, language 
and myth.  
Word and mythic image, which once confronted the human mind as hard 
realistic powers, have now cast off all reality and effectuality; they have 
become a light, bright ether in which the spirit can move without let or 
hindrance. This liberation is achieved not because the mind throws aside the 
sensuous forms of word and image, but in that it uses them both as organs of 
its own, and thereby recognizes them for what they really are: forms of its 
own self-revelation. [Cassirer 1946, 99] 
 
 The idea of the scientific mind using word and image as “organs of its 
own…self-revelation” is especially important: in scientific problem solving experts 
consciously choose to use materialistic (and other concrete) metaphors drawn from 
daily life.  That is, for as long as it is useful, the expert knowingly acts as if the 
metaphor is literal, then switches to a more abstract metaphor for which there is no 
experiential basis, or even runs contrary to the expectations of naïve experience. On 
such occasions, the expert’s recourse to seamlessly juxtaposing qualitative and 
quantitative thinking whenever possible (ala Jeppsson), enables powerful inferential 
moves facilitated by a range of mathematical formulae. The whole range of modes, 
from concrete metaphor to abstract mathematical relation, is used in various stages 
of scientific inquiry, whether the inquirer is novice or expert. The differences 
between them emerge with the sophistication of abstractions, on the one hand, and 
the facility of moving between abstraction and concreteness when need and 
opportunity arise.  
 
6. A Chemical Concept of Metaphor: Reconsidering the Chemical Element 
 Let us return at last to the definition of chemical element, as established by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  	  In	  3	  volumes	  [1925-­‐29]	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  	  Cassirer	  draws	  on	  a	  broad	  multidisciplinary	  pool	  of	  evidence	  from	  human,	  social	  and	  physical	  science	  of	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century.	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IUPAC. I consider the most intriguing part of Paneth’s formulation of this concept of 
element to be the necessity of schwanken, the oscillation21 between the abstract 
transcendental and the concrete naïve realist view.  In an earlier section of this 
chapter we noted that this definition suspends the concept of element in a space of 
speculation between the two poles in much the same way that metaphor suspends 
judgment between intersecting sets of alternative meanings. Where definitions are 
intended to attenuate the inherent polysemy of language, metaphor activates 
multiple sets. The unique feature of the IUPAC definition, seen below, is that it 
wants it both ways: the distinction is spelled out in the second definition but 
withdrawn by the end: 
1. A species of atoms; all atoms with the same number of protons in the 
atomic nucleus.  
2. A pure chemical substance composed of atoms with the same number of 
protons in the atomic nucleus. Sometimes this concept is called the 
elementary substance as distinct from the chemical element as defined 
under 1, but mostly the term chemical element is used for both concepts.  
    [http://goldbook.iupac.org/C01022.html] 
 
 It is interesting that both definitions of chemical element are deemed 
necessary, that neither can be reduced to its partner, nor can both be reduced to a 
simpler definition. Two definitions of element are brought together as partner terms 
in a metaphor. There is an irreducible space between them and this is what metaphor 
posits between similars. The relation between the definitions is not only semantic or 
syntactic, it is pragmatic: it does what Hesse refers to as taking a “stance” on the 
world. The relational space between the metaphorical partners draws on potential 
domains of application, potential relevance-determining contexts. Every metaphor 
must be generated in the service of a particular experiment that is specified by the 
experimenter’s research design, instruments and ceteris paribus conditions. The 
chemist’s practice  is also shaped by existing theoretical models that more or less fit the 
experiment design, materials, and collected data. There is always a gap of some 
unknown size, a space between the general conditions for the application of existing 
models and the actual conditions, between the generalities of theories and best 
practices, and the particulars of the experiment at hand in the present moment. 
 The space of metaphor, the space between the familiar and the unfamiliar, is 
filled with the “light, bright ether” that Cassirer speaks of (see previous section). It is 
the same space indicated by Kuhn’s questions, “How does mathematics attach to the 
world?”, “How do our concepts attach to the world?” and, “How does language 
attach to things?” Though devils lay in wait in the particular details, at root the 
answer is the same: the attachment is metaphorical. But what does that mean? 
Cassirer’s idea of radical metaphor captures this question in its primal instance, i.e., the 
first utterance of a word: 
Indeed, even the most primitive verbal utterance requires the transmutation of 
a certain cognitive or emotive experience into sound, i.e., into a medium that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Mahootian,	  F.	  2013	  “Paneth’s epistemology of chemical elements in light of Kant’s Opus 
postumum.” Foundations	  of	  Chemistry	  15:171-­‐184.	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is foreign to the experience, and even quite disparate; even as the simplest 
mythical form can arise only by virtue of a transformation which removes a 
certain impression from the realm of the ordinary, the everyday and profane, 
and lifts it to the level of the “holy,” the sphere of mythico-religious 
“significance.” This involves not merely a transference, but a real 
µεταβασισ εισ αλλο γενοσ; in fact, it is not only a transition to another 
category, but actually the creation of the category itself. [Cassirer 1923/1953, 
87-8] 
 
Cassirer’s reconfigures the discussion of metaphor in this passage. His thoughts 
about the creativity of what he calls “genuine radical metaphor” closely resemble 
what Whitehead, Kuhn, Harre and Hesse have noted as the creative function, 
specifically the knowledge creation function of metaphor. This conception goes beyond 
the standard ways of mapping the terms, or concepts, of an analogy or analyzing a 
metaphor’s transference of properties between categories.22 Interesting, fruitful and 
popular as semantic- and logic-mapping exercises are, we have something new here. 
Cassirer draws attention to radical metaphor’s creation of new categories.  
 In seeking radical metaphor in the human urge toward symbolic expression, 
Cassirer found the unbridgeable space between experience and language. This gap is 
the source and scene of radical metaphor. In this “empty” space, to which neither 
language nor thought can lay claim, is the originary experience that Whitehead was 
so interested in. The creativity that an individual is capable of, the true novelty of the 
as-yet-unspoken, lurks in the “wilds of so-called ‘empty space’” [Whitehead 1929, 
199]. By “empty” Whitehead meant space that is empty of the ordering activity of 
(human and non-human) agents; this “interstitial” space is where he locates life and 
consciousness. While both life and consciousness rely on (more or less) stable 
chemical cycles they do not merely replicate these patterns but take advantage of the 
order and energy they generate and maintain. This is where Whitehead sought the 
ultimate potential for spontaneity [Whitehead 1929, 105-6].  
 Just as the spontaneity and novelty of life and consciousness are dependent on 
the regularity and stability of physics and chemistry, so too thought relies upon the 
stability of language and cultural norms. Thought is partly dependent and 
constrained by language but it grows and thrives by altering these constraints through 
the creation of new words that redefining the old by recasting them in connection 
with other players, other contexts of interaction. Scientific knowledge is necessarily 
constrained by vast networks of vocabularies, categories, procedures, algorithms, 
models, instrument, data, etc. Nevertheless, knowledge continues to grow because 
scientists design experimental conditions and induce data to which the network of 
the known may not apply very well, or at all. Whether or not these conditions are 
brought about deliberately, on such occasions scientists must improvise activities 
based on partially applicable existing models. Improvisation takes the form of 
metaphorical and instrumental incursions into the unknown. Boyle knew this, and 
sees this as part of normal life in a research lab: metaphors, analogies and models are 
retained only so long as they work to achieve well-articulated goals identified by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  As	  found	  for	  example	  in	  Lakoff,	  G.,	  and	  Johnson	  [2008].	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changing norms, standards and challenges of disciplinary cultures. MacDonald
 Publication a central goal that encapsulates past research, secures the position 
of researchers and propagates future research. Publication within a scientific 
discipline is more than a simple record of events, facts, materials, methods and so on. 
It is a complex interweaving of data, interpretation, rhetoric, style… it is an act as 
well as a fact. Moreover, chemistry, and a few other allied sciences, actually create 
the objects of their discipline. In such fields, the role of rhetoric is sometimes 
heightened. An example from Graves’ account of MacDonald’s publication process 
bears this point out.  
 Graves	  recounts	  that	  the original draft of the article was rejected and 
reviewers offered comments, suggestions and requirements for additional data. 
Rather	  than	  running	  the	  experiment	  again	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  new	  data,	  MacDonald 
presented a different selection of data previously gathered. MacDonald coupled his 
additional data with citations of data and theories about the photoconductivity of 
similar amorphous semiconductors, containing varying amounts of nitrogen. Graves 
analyzed the manner in which MacDonald used metonyms to make claims about 
structure on the basis of the semiconductor’s behavior under various conditions23. In	  this	  case,	  which	  is	  by	  no	  means	  uncommon	  in	  scientific	  literature,	  select	  processes	  were	  made	  to	  stand	  for	  structures	  whose	  existence	  the	  peer	  reviewer	  initially	  contested	  but	  finally	  accepted.	  The phenomena and actual entity under discussion, 
i.e., photoconductivity in an amorphous semiconductor, did not change between the 
prepublication draft and the published version: in both phases, MacDonald tried to 
establish the existence of a specific kind of structure for the photoconductive thin 
film they had generated using the IBAD process in their lab. Graves analyzes shifts 
in reasoning and presentation of ideas surrounding the manufacture and testing of 
the a-SiNx. Furthermore she analyzed stages of the research team’s response to the 
reviewer’s comments. Graves’ summary of the process asserts that the team  
pursued a cyclical process of collecting measurements…, conjecturing about 
the process(es) that yielded those measurements, and pursuing various 
explanations for the physical structure suggested by the combination of data 
and theory. Through this complex process, they derived evidence of the 
existence of particular characteristics such as structural properties or flaws in 
the a-SiNx. However, the movement, back and forth between real entities and 
proposed theoretical concepts and processes often blurred the boundary 
between what was real and what was theoretical. [Graves 2005, 193] 
Graves here conflates “real” with “data.” This conflation indicates her tacit 
commitment to a metaphysical realism that is at odds with the various alternatives to 
realism she ably discusses in her book. Similarly, the “blurring of the boundary” 
refers to a hard boundary that is only there if one accepts the “standard view” 
philosophy of science distinctions between theoretical and empirical. Similarly, her 
invocation of boundary indicates buy-in to the demarcation of the standard view’s 
“context of justification” vs  “context of discovery” distinction, a distinction whose 
absoluteness was successfully challenged over 50 years ago by philosophers and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Metonymy	  is	  a	  specific	  kind	  of	  metaphor	  that	  makes	  a	  part,	  or	  aspect,	  stand	  for	  the	  whole	  e.g.,	  saying	  “friends,	  Romans,	  countrymen,	  lend	  me	  your	  ears.”	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sociologists of science.   
 There is a significant difference between theory and data, but it is better 
characterized not as blurring, but as interaction: a mutual interdependence that 
varies according to discipline, experimental setting and context. Decades of research 
on the actual practice of science has sharpened the focus on the relationship between 
data and theory: the relationship is a blur to the extent players have not articulated 
the dynamics of their interaction. Neither Graves nor MacDonald is a philosopher, 
so their use of philosophical terms pertaining to science are not always consistent. 
However, this does not diminish the value of their collaboration and documentation 
of an inquiry process that extends from a statement of research goals to final 
publication of experimental research. Graves has demonstrated that the blending of 
data, theory, model, interpretation and rhetoric occurs with some degree of 
deliberation at every step. Regardless of the specific rhetorical theory one may 
subscribe to, and regardless of which kind of realist or non-realist philosophy one 
favors, it is clear that the practice of science involves tacit and fluctuating 
commitments to both. Nowhere is their oscillation more explicit than in 
chemistry’s bimodal definition of element. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 Metaphor is not merely linguistic; it can also be deployed as a conceptual 
strategy that disrupts fixation on any one of two or more explanatory frames that it 
brings together. In the latter capacity, it enables thought to get on with the important 
business of innovating something beyond the existing consensus on what, for 
example, is an element, whether basic or simple; what is bonding; structure; shape; 
etc. For example, Rom Harré has elaborated24 the concept of natural properties to 
express the notion of contingent, dispositional properties that are especially in 
evidence in the practice of chemistry.  
The substance-attribute metaphysics immanent in the chemistry of the past 
must give way to metaphysics of spatially and temporally distributed causal 
powers to do justice to the way chemistry now appears. The language of the 
foundations of chemistry must be a language of tendencies and dispositions. 
[Harré 2010, 110] 
Harré’s examination of what he calls “chemical vernacular”, as opposed to the 
specialized language of philosophers writing about chemistry, reveals a consistent 
reliance on causal power of particular agents. Harré calls for better alignment 
between the abstractions of the philosophy of chemistry and the concrete vernacular 
of chemical practice. Effective metaphors modify the behavior of chemists toward a 
given substance or reaction system by distributing attention among the several 
dispositional properties that pertain to a given experimental situation, depending on 
the instrumentation and observational conditions used. The late-20th century wave of 
science studies tend toward Pickering’s idea that something like a “mangle of 
practice,” the mutual resistance and accommodation of theory, instrumentation and 
practice, applies to all contemporary sciences. Over three and a half centuries ago,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Harré,	  R.,	  	  2010,	  Causal	  concepts	  in	  chemical	  vernaculars.	  Foundations	  of	  Chemistry	  12:101–115	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chemistry emerged by acknowledging and wrestling with this dynamic 
interdependence to create a seemingly endless list of materials and processes.  It 
should be no surprise then, given the role of metaphor in scientific creativity, that 
chemistry has been literally the most creative of the sciences.  
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